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N.L.R.B. Campaign Propaganda: A
Call for Congressional Reform
SUSAN GARDNER*
With its decision in Midland National Life Insurance Company, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board no longer probes into the truth or falsity of
statements made during he course of preelection campaigns. The decision
marks the third policy reversal in regulating campaign propaganda dur-
ing the last five years. Of concern to employers and unions is the uncer-
tainty of Board resolutions in this area, particularly when each policy
reversal was preceded immediately by Presidential appointments to the
Board. This article traces the shifting Board policy of regulating cam-
paign misrepresentations and calls for Congressional intervention to stabi-
lize the preelection process.
1'. INTRODUCTION
Among the most troublesome issues that haunt the National
Labor Relations Board (Board) are incidents of employer and
union misrepresentations prior to union representation elections.'
During the course of these frequently bitter campaigns, less-than-
* A.B., University of California, Berkeley, 1968; J.D., University of the Pacific,
McGeorge School of Law, Sacramento, California, 1977. Associate Professor,
School of Business, Department of Management, California State University,
Chico.
1. The National Labor Relations Board [hereinafter cited as NLRB or Board]
was created by Congress to administer the National Labor Relations (Wagner)
Act, ch. 372, §§ 1-16, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169)
(1976 and Supp. V 1981) [hereinafter cited as NLRA, Act, or Wagner Act]. The two
main functions of the Board are to conduct and certify representation elections
and to investigate unfair labor practices.
accurate statements may be made to voting employees. The
Board must determine whether to take action against those who
have profited by the inaccurate election propaganda. 2
A growing concern of employers, unions, and the courts is the
increasing uncertainty of Board resolutions in this critical area. 3
In three of the past five years, the Board has reversed its major
decisions on the standards it will apply to cases of preelection
misrepresentation. 4 Neither party to these contests is thus able
to conduct zealous campaigns without knowing whether the elec-
tion results will be certified or set aside and a new election
ordered.
This article traces the history of the regulation of campaign
misrepresentation; examines the two extreme positions which
have been the focus of debate and, finding neither satisfactory,
calls for Congress to eliminate the shifts in policy by establishing
a concrete standard.
II. BACKGROUND
Before analyzing the Board's current policy on regulating pre-
election misrepresentation, knowledge of Board election
processes as well as a historical perspective of the issue are
essential.
A. Representation Elections
Under the National Labor Relations Act (Act), employees have
the right to select or refrain from selecting an exclusive represen-
tative5 for the purpose of collective bargaining.6 One method for
employees to exercise their "freedom of choice" is by voting for or
against a union in a Board-conducted representation election.7
The Act itself affords little guidance for the conduct of repre-
sentation elections, providing only that the method of voting be
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (b)(1), 160(a) (1976). The Board has the authority
to set the election aside and order a new election in instances of misrepresenta-
tion and improper campaign tactics. R. WniIAMs, P. JANUS & K. HUHN, NLRB REG-
ULATION OF ELECTION CONDUCT 11-12 (University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School,
Vance Hall/CS, Labor Relations and Public Policy Series No. 8, 1974) [hereinafter
cited as WLLAs].
3. See, e.g., NLRB v. Mosey Mfg. Co., 595 F.2d 375, 376 (7th Cir. 1979) (com-
menting on "great flux" of law involving pre-election misrepresentation).
4. Shopping Kart Food Mkt., Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977); General Knit of
California, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978); Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. No.
24 (1982).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976). The parties bargain over wages, hours and other
terms and conditions of employment.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1) (1976). See also NLRB v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 309
U.S. 206, 226 (1940).
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by secret ballot.8 However, judicial interpretation of the Act has
declared that the Board has "a wide degree of discretion" in
promulgating "the procedure and safeguards" for representation
elections. 9 The procedures developed by the Board have been
based on the policy that representation elections must "assure
the employees full and complete freedom of choice in selecting a
bargaining representative." 0 Free choice has been viewed as
more than simply noncoerced choice.1 1 Rather, the Board has
sought to provide an atmosphere "free not only from interference,
restraint, or coercion. . . but also from other elements which pre-
vent or impede a reasoned choice."'1 2 One area of employer and
union activity which has been frequently regulated to assure the
exercise of reasoned choice is preelection propaganda.13 If the
Board determines the campaign propaganda substantially inter-
fered with the election by prohibiting employees' free choice,
then the election may be set aside and a new election ordered, re-
gardless of whether the conduct was also deemed an unfair labor
practice.14
B. The Initial Policy--1935 to 1947
Initially, the Board was reluctant to intervene in the representa-
tion election process by probing into the truth or falsity of pre-
election propaganda. 15 Eventually, however, the Board began to
view the issue of representation as involving only the union and
8. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1976).
9. NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 330 (1946). See also Souther S.S. Co.
v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 37 (1942); NLRB v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 309 U.S. 206, 226
(1940).
10. Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 223 (1962). See also Peerless
Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429 (1953); General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124
(1948).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976) (expressly prohibiting coercion of employees
in exercise of their section 7 rights of selecting or refraining from selecting exclu-
sive representation).
12. Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 70 (1962) (emphasis added). See also Bok,
The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. REV. 38, 47 (1964).
13. 138 N.L.R.B. at 70. Preelection propaganda is measured from the time of
filing a petition for election to the time a representation election is conducted.
Ideal Elec. & Mfg. Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 1275, 1278 (1961).
14. See WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 19-20. See also General Shoe Corp., 77
N.L.R.B. at 126.
15. E.g., Maywood Hosiery Mills, Inc., 64 N.L.R.B. 146 (1945). See also MORRIS,
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 91 (1971).
the employees.16 Thereafter, employer campaign statements, by
their very nature, were seen as being prejudicial to the interests
of employees. 17 As a matter of course, these statements were
considered unfair labor practices, causing the elections to be set
aside.18 Conversely, the Board rarely intervened in those in-
stances where union propaganda was at issue.' 9 Rather, employ-
ees were charged with recognizing union propaganda "for what it
[was] and discount[ing] it."20 For example, in Maywood Hosiery
Mills, Inc., 21 the Board declared that it "[had] never undertaken
to police ... union campaigns, to weigh the truth or falsehood of
... union utterances, or to curb the enthusiastic efforts of em-
ployee adherents .... 22
What had begun as a uniform Board policy of strict neutrality
in judging election propaganda had evolved into a dual standard-
intervention for employer propaganda and nonintervention for
union propaganda. Subsequently, this predilection of the Board
towards union propaganda in contrast to its imposition of strin-
gent standards on employer misstatements prompted criticism to
mount on two fronts-the courts and the Congress. 2 3
C. The Courts and Congress React
In 1941, the United States Supreme Court rendered the
16. See 1 NLRB Ann. Rep. 70-76 (1936); WiLLiAms, supra note 2, at 17.
17. WmAmMs, supra note 2, at 17. See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright Corp., 43 N.L.R.B.
795 (1942); Rockford Mitten & Hosiery Co., 16 N.L.R.B. 501 (1939).
18. 1 NLRB Ann. Rep. 73 (1936). To avoid first amendment challenges, the
Board never found a violation on the basis of speech alone. Rather, "hostility
to[ward] self-organization" was used as the prime determinant. Even so, speech
was regulated. Comment, Labor Law Reform: The Regulation of Free Speech and
Equal Access in NLRB Representation Elections, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 758 & nn.
17-19 (1979). See also NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1941); Schult
Trailers, Inc., 28 N.L.R.B. 975 (1941); Ford Motor Co., 23 N.LR.B. 342 (1940); South-
ern Colo. Power Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 699 (1939); Muskin Shoe Co., 8 N.L.R.B. 1 (1938).
19. E.g., Southeastern Clay Co., 73 N.L.R.B. 614 (1947); Maywood Hosiery
Mills, Inc., 64 N.L.R.B. 146 (1945); Corn Prods. Refining Co., 58 N.L.R.B. 1441 (1944).
Contra Continental Oil Co., 58 N.L.R.B. 169 (1944) (election was set aside because
of union actions which made impartial election impossible); Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
47 N.L.R.B. 291 (1943) (election was set aside because union claimed it had re-
ceived Board endorsement).
20. Corn Prods. Refining Co., 58 N.L.R.B. at 1442.
21. 64 N.L.R.B. 146 (1945). See also Wilson Athletic Goods Mfg. Co., 73
N.L.R.B. 744 (1947); Kroder-Reubel Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 240 (1947); Aurora Wall Paper
Mill, Inc., 72 N.L.R.B. 1035 (1947).
22. 64 N.L.R.B. at 150.
23. Killingsworth, Employer Freedom of Speech and the NLRB, 1941 Wis. L.
REV. 211, 237. See also NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941);
H.R. Rep. No. 1902, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 82-83, 90-91 (1940); Raskin, Deregulation of
Union Campaigns: Restoring the First Amendment Balance, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1175,
1175-76 (1976).
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landmark decision of NLRB ?). Virginia Electric and Power Co.24
Rejecting the Board's limitation of employer speech, the Supreme
Court held that employers had a constitutional right to express
noncoercive opinions during organizational campaigns. 25 How-
ever, employer speech was subject to scrutiny in order to deter-
mine whether the "total activities" of the employer interfered
with employee organizational rights.26 Subsequent to Virginia
Electric, Board decisions appeared to provide a degree of latitude
towards employer statements made during organizational
campaigns. 27
Notwithstanding the "less restrictive" approach taken by the
Board, Congress enacted sweeping legislation in 1947, known as
the Taft-Hartley Act, which had the purpose of bringing more bal-
ance to the Wagner Act.28 The Republican Congress found prior
Board decisions in the area of speech far too restrictive.29 Thus,
section 8(c), 30 the "free speech" proviso, was enacted not only to
24. 314 U.S. 469 (1941). Virginia Electric contended that the company and its
employees had enjoyed a relationship of understanding without the involvement
of a union. Thus, the interests of employees were best served by continuing this
relationship of "confidence and understanding." The Board found the communica-
tions interfered with employee organizational rights. Virginia Elec. & Power Co.,
20 N.L.R.B. 911, 919-24 (1940). See also NLRB v. American Tube Bending Co., 134
F.2d 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 768 (1943).
25. 314 U.S. at 477.
26. Id. On remand, the Board determined that the totality of the employer's
conduct was coercive in nature. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 44 N.L.R.B. at 429,
aff'd, 132 F.2d 390 (4th Cir. 1.942), affrd, 319 U.S. 533 (1943).
27. E.g., Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 142 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1944); Clark
Bros. Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 802, enforced in part 163 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1947). See also
Wollett & Rowen, Employer Speech and Related Issues, 16 OHIO ST. UJ. 380 (1955);
Note, 14 U. CHI. L. REV. 104 (1946).
28. Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976)) [hereinafter referred to as Taft-
Hartley]. See also NLRB v. Golub Corp., 388 F.2d 921, 926-27 (2d Cir. 1967); Reilly
The Legislative History of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 285 (1960).
29. E.g., S. REP. No. 105 on S. 1126; 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MAN-
AGEMENT RELATIONS ACT 1947, 429-430 (1948); H.R. Rep. No. 345 on H.R. 3020; 1 LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT 1947, 299, 324 (1978).
See also Koretz, Employer Interference with Union Organization versus Employer
Free Speech, 29 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 399 (1960).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1976) [hereinafter referred to as 8(c)]. 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(c) reads in full:
The expressing of any -views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination
thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not con-
stitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provi-
sions of this subchapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal
or force or promise of benefit.
Id.
guarantee both employer and union speech but also to provide
Congressional interpretation as to the limitations which may be
placed on speech in a labor-management context.31 Under section
8(c), "[t]he expressing of any views, argument, or opinion ...
shall not constitute . . .an unfair labor practice . . . if such ex-
pression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit."32
Following enactment of section 8(c), the Board refused once
again to probe into the truth or falsity of campaign statements. 33
Rather, emphasis was placed on employee abilities to use their
"good sense" in assessing campaign propaganda.34 However, this
neutrality in examining election propaganda was short-lived.
D. The Board Responds
In 1948, the Board rendered its first decision in response to sec-
tion 8(c): General Shoe Corp.35 The decision was significant for
two reasons: one, it created the "laboratory conditions" standard
as a requisite for Board-conducted elections; 36 and two, it distin-
guished instances of Board intervention based on the type of
proceeding.37
Read literally, section 8(c) applies only to unfair labor practice
proceedings, even though there is support in the legislative record
for the position that Congress intended its scope to include elec-
tion cases.38 Exploiting this facial distinction, the Board held:
"We do not subscribe to the view ... that the criteria applied...
in a representation proceeding ... need necessarily be identical
to those employed in testing whether an unfair labor practice was
31. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23, n.38 (1947); H.R. REP. No. 510,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1947); H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess 8 (1947); 93
CONG. REC. 6859-60 (1947).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1976).
33. E.g., N.P. Nelson Iron Works, Inc., 78 N.L.R.B. 1270 (1948); Carrollton Furni-
ture Mfg. Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 710 (1948); 13 NLRB Ann. Rep. 49-50 (1948).
34. N.P. Nelson Iron Works, Inc., 78 N.L.R.B. at 1271; Carrollton Furniture Mfg.
Co., 75 N.L.R.B. at 712.
35. 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
36. Id. at 127. Under the laboratory condition requirement, the Board views
the election environment as a laboratory and insists the same conditions used to
purify a scientific laboratory must also exist within the election environment.
37. Id. at 126-27.
38. See supra note 31. See also Note, Free Speech and Free Choice in Repre-
sentation Elections: Effect of Taft Hartley Act Section 8(c), 58 YALE L.J. 165, 174
(1948); Comment, Labor Law Reform: The Regulation of Free Speech and Equal
Access in NLRB Representation Elections, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 762, n.45 (1979).
Further, the dissent in General Shoe would have applied the same standard in a
representation election as that used in unfair labor practice cases. 77 N.L.R.B. at
131.
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committed .... ,,39 Henceforth, the role of the Board in election
proceedings would be to assure the simulation of "laboratory con-
ditions" so that employees could exercise their uninhibited
choice. 40 No criteria for, these conditions were given.4 1
Immediately thereafter, the Eisenhower-appointed Board re-
fused to probe into the truth or falsity of campaign statements,
absent violence or coercion.42 As noted in The Liberal Market,
Inc., 43 the Board recognized that elections did "not occur in a lab-
oratory where controlled or artificial conditions may be estab-
lished."4 4 Thus, the role of the Board was "to establish ideal
conditions insofar as possible," to assess "the actual facts in the
light of realistic standards of human conduct."45 It appeared that
the laboratory conditions espoused by General Shoe would be in-
terpreted in light of section 8(c), serving to limit Board interven-
tion in election proceedings. 46
39. General Shoe Corp., '17 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948). See also Bok, supra note
12, at 45-47.
40. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. at 127.
41. Nevertheless, the conditions requisite for providing "untrammeled choice"
were adjudged as not being present in General Shoe. Id. at 126. The employer
gave an anti-union address to a group of employees and had sent foremen to em-
ployees' homes to deliver a similar message. Although the conduct was not
deemed coercive and, thus, not an unfair labor practice, it was viewed as impairing
employee choice. Id. Because the conditions of the laboratory were not ideal,
"the experiment [election]... [had to be] conducted over again." Id. at 127. See
also Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. NLRB, 451 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1971), in which a first
amendment challenge was raised unsuccessfully.
42. E.g., National Furniture Co., Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 1 (1957); Lux Clock Mfg. Co.,
Inc., 113 N.L.R.B. 1194 (1955); L.G. Everist, Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 810, 811-12 (1955);
Southwestern Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 805, 806 (1955); American Laundry Mach. Co., 107
N.L.R.B. 511 (1953). See also Wirtz, The New National Labor Relations Board:
Herein of "Employer Persuasion," 49 Nw. U.L. REV. 594, 600-01 (1954).
43. 108 N.L.R.B. 1481 (1954).
44. Id. at 1482.
45. Id.
46. Nevertheless, standards for laboratory conditions emerged, which focused
on whether the manner in which a campaign statement was made impaired em-
ployee abilities to evaluate it as propaganda. For example, in West-Gate Sun Har-
bor Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 830, 833 (1951), the Board intimated that incidents of "gross
misconduct" during the election campaign would warrant Board intervention. Al-
though the union made statements that the election of a rival would result in
lengthy strike activity, the Board held the statement did not fall into the excep-
tions of "violence, coercion or other gross misconduct," and thus intervention was
not warranted.
Shortly thereafter a series of decisions added another exception for Board scru-
tiny: that of deceptive tactics which precluded effective employee evaluation of the
campaign statements. In Timken-Detroit Axle Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 790, 792 (1952), the
Board set aside the election because of the manner in which the campaign state-
Not until 1955, in Gummed Products Co.,47 did the Board
begin to scrutinize the substance of preelection statements. The
day before the election, the union misrepresented wages it had
negotiated at another plant. The Board admitted that it rarely
"censor[ed] or police[d] preelection propaganda . . . absent
threats or acts of violence." 48 However, "some limits" had been
imposed.49  Taking these limitations into account, the Board
concluded:
[eixaggerations, inaccuracies, partial truths, name-calling, and falsehoods,
while not condoned, may be excused as legitimate propaganda, provided
they are not so misleading as to prevent the exercise of a free choice ....
The ultimate consideration is whether the challenged propaganda has
lowered the standards of campaigning to the point where it may be said
that the uninhibited desires of the employees cannot be determined in an
election.
5 0
The decision introduced three considerations for future Board in-
tervention into election proceedings: one, misleading statements;
two, deliberate misrepresentation; and three, timing of the
misrepresentation. 5 1
With the introduction of the Kennedy or "New Frontier" Board,
the resurgence of the "laboratory conditions" 52 concept returned.
In Dal-Tex Optical Co., Inc., 53 the employer stated the election
ment was made. The employer distributed an anti-union statement, alleging it
was a spontaneous appeal from an employee. Finding the employees were
"blinded to the fact that . . . the [e mployer" was the source of the letter, the
Board held, "[tlhe use of plain envelopes misrepresented to the employees the
source of this anti-union propaganda, thereby infringing their right to a fair oppor-
tunity to evaluate it." Id. In United Aircraft Corp., Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Div.,
103 N.L.R.B. 102, 105 (1953), one union forged a telegram, misidentifying it as from
a rival union. The president of the rival union allegedly apologized for misconduct
and extolled the virtues of the competing union's president. The Board asserted
that the telegram could not be evaluated as mere campaign propaganda since its
source was mendacious. See also Radio Corp. of Am., 106 N.L.R.B. 1393, 1394
(1953).
47. 112 N.L.R.B. 1092 (1955). See also NLRB v. Southern Paper Box Co., 473
F.2d 208 (8th Cir. 1973); The Trane Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1506 (1962); Hicks-Hayward
Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 695 (1957); Thomas Gouzoule, 117 N.L.R.B. 1026 (1957); Comfort
Slipper Corp., 112 N.L.R.B. 183 (1955); contra Otis Elevator Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 1490,
1492 (1955). In Otis the Board retreated from its position in Gummed Products.
The case again involved misrepresentation of wages and benefits; however, they
were made by the employees whom the union was attempting to organize. The
Board refused to invalidate the election, stating: "[The misrepresentations] dealt
with information which was within the employees' own knowledge and which they
themselves could properly evaluate."
48. 112 N.L.R.B. at 1093.
49. Id. (citing United Aircraft Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 102 (1953)).
50. Id. at 1093-94.
51. Id. See also Kawneer Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1460, 1461 (1958); Allis Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 744 (1957); Thomas Gouzoule, 117 N.L.R.B. at 1026; Reiss As-
soc. Inc., 116 N.L.R.B. 217 (1956); WILLIAMs, supra note 2, at 22-23.
52. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
53. 137 N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962). See also United States Gypsum Co., 130 N.L.R.B.
901, 902-03 (1961); Bowman Biscuit Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 202 (1959).
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process would "not mean a thing if the union wins," because the
employer would take a "couple of years" to litigate it.54 The
Board overturned the election, finding "the test of conduct which
may interfere with the 'laboratory conditions' for an election is
considerably more restrictive than the test of conduct which
amounts to ... [an unfair labor practice]."5
In summary, Board regulation of propaganda between 1935 and
1947 appeared to be dependent upon the philosophical disposition
of the Board.56 After announcing its General Shoe 57 decision,
wherein "laboratory conditions" were requisite to an uninhibited
election process, the Board retreated to its earlier position of non-
intervention. 8 However, based on a case-by-case determination,
this approach was relaxed for incidents involving material mis-
statements, deceptive tactics impairing independent employee
evaluation, knowledge exclusive to the speaker, and inadequate
time for rebuttal.5 9 The preceding melange of decisions was
finally consolidated in 1962,60 in an effort to "balance the right of
the employees to an untrammeled choice, and the right of the par-
ties to wage a free and vigorous campaign with all the normal le-
gitimate tools of electioneering."6 1
III. HOLLYWOOD CERAMICS
From 1962 to 1977, the unanimous decision of Hollywood Ceram-
ics provided the definitive standard for Board evaluation of pree-
lection propaganda. 62 Because more recent decisions involving
campaign misrepresentations have either overruled or returned to
the Hollywood Ceramics standard,63 the decision, an analysis
54. 137 N.L.R.B. at 1783.
55. Id. at 1786-87.
56. See Hickey, Stare Decisis and the NLRB, 17 LAB. L.J. 451, 460-63 (1966);
WiLwAMs, supra note 2, at 6.
57. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
59. See MORRIS, supra note 15, at 91.
60. Hollywood Ceramics, 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962).
61. Id. at 224. Cf. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., Local 114, 383
U.S. 53 (1966) (court held that where party to labor dispute circulates false and
defamatory statements during union organizing campaign, court has jurisdiction
to apply state remedies if complainant proves that statements were made with
malice and that he was injured).
62. 140 N.L.R.B. at 224. See also York Furniture Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. 1487 (1968);
WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 26.
63. Shopping Kart Food Mkt., Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977) (overruling
Hollywood Ceramics); General Knit of California, Inc., 239 N.LR.B. 619 (1978)
93
thereof and an account of the disaffection among the courts
follow.
A. The Decision
The day before the election, the union distributed a circular al-
legedly comparing employer wage rates with those of unionized
plants. The comparison was inaccurate because an incentive pay
plan, while included in the data for the wages of unionized plants,
was omitted in the wage rates for the employer's plant. The effect
of the omission was an understatement of employer wage rates
by thirty percent. Furthermore, the type of operation, jobs and
requisite skill levels of the plants were not analogous and thus,
any information purporting to compare the two was erroneous. 64
The union contended the information was not deliberately
inaccurate.
While recognizing that "absolute precision of statement and
complete honesty are not always attainable," 65 the Board, never-
theless, believed that a proper balance between honest informa-
tion and uninhibited speech could be achieved by assuring that
elections were conducted under unimpaired laboratory condi-
tions. 66 The standard for review of whether laboratory conditions
existed was restated as follows:
[A]n election should be set aside only where there has been a misrepre-
sentation or other similar campaign trickery, which involves a substantial
departure from the truth, at a time which prevents the other party . . .
from making an effective reply, so that the misrepresentation, whether de-
liberate or not, may reasonably be expected to have a significant impact
on the election.6
7
As the standard was not intended to have unlimited applicability,
the Board cautioned that "exaggeration, inaccuracies, half-truths,
and name calling, though not condoned, will not be grounds for
setting aside elections."68
B. The Analysis
The Hollywood Ceramics standard represented a consolidation
of four determinative factors gleaned from earlier cases for evalu-
ating whether an election should be overturned. The thrust of the
evaluation concentrated on whether the preelection misstate-
(reinstating Hollywood Ceramics); Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. No. 24
(1982) (overruling Hollywood Ceramics).
64. Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. at 222-23.
65. Id. at 223. See also Celanese Corp. of Am. v. NLRB, 291 F.2d 224, 226 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 925 (1961).
66. 140 N.L.R.B. at 224.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 224 n.6.
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ments: one, were material and substantial; two, prevented in-
dependent employee evaluation; three, precluded opportunity for
reply; and four, involved the intimate knowledge of the speaker.69
Interpretation provided by the Board as well as the "conjunc-
tive" phrasing of the standard imply that all factors must impede
employee choice in order to warrant the setting aside of an elec-
tion.70 Pursuant to this standard, the misstatement must depart
substantially from the truth.7 1 Recalling that an election would
not be invalidated for "exaggerations," the Board must thus dis-
cern between "puffery" and substantial departure.72 Furthermore,
though the misstatement may be substantial, it must also involve
a material issue, one that is important as opposed to de minimis,
to employees in their exercise of free choice. 73
Nevertheless, a substantial departure would not justify invali-
dating an election if the impact of the misstatement was not sig-
nificant to the process. 74 Thus, a substantial departure from the
truth may be so blatant as to warn employees of its falsity or em-
ployees may possess kniowledge so as to be able to independently
evaluate the misstatement, causing the impact of the misstate-
ment to become insignificant in the preelection process. Assum-
ing the misinformation was substantial and material, with a
significant impact on the process, the election would nonetheless
be validated if the party had an opportunity to rebut the misstate-
ments.75 Whether they exercised their opportunity was not criti-
69. Id. at 223. The standard has been analyzed as a four or five factor test. See
WiLmAMs, supra note 2, at 26-27; NLRB v. Cactus Drilling Corp., 455 F.2d 871, 874
(5th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. O.S. Walker Co., 469 F.2d 813, 817 (lst Cir. 1972); MORRIS,
supra note 15, at 91; Phalen, The Demise of Hollywood Ceramics: Fact and Fan-
tasy, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 450, 453 (1977).
70. 140 N.L.R.B. at 224. See also MORRIS, supra note 15, at 92.
71. 140 N.L.R.B. at 224.
72. Id. at 224 n.6. See, e.g., Cross Baking Co., 186 N.L.R.B. 199 (1970); Southern
Foods, Inc., 171 N.L.R.B. 999 (1968).
73. 140 N.L.R.B. at 224. See also NLRB v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co.,
300 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1962); ]Bailey Meter Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 1227 (1972); Allis-Chal-
mers Mfg. Co., 194 N.L.R.B. 1014 (1972); The Trane Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1506 (1962);
WiuAMs, supra note 2, at 33-39. According to a later case, materiality is also de-
termined by whether the speaker has or is presumed to have intimate knowledge
of the subject matter of the statement. Cumberland Wood & Chair Corp., 211
N.L.R.B. 312 n.1 (1974).
74. 140 N.L.R.B. at 224. See also Uniroyal, Inc., 169 N.L.R.B. 918 (1968).
75. 140 N.L.R.B. at 224. See also General Elec. Co. Specialty Control Dept., 162
N.L.R.B. 912 (1967). However, an issue raised early in the campaign about which a
last minute misstatement is made may not force the election to be set aside de-
spite the lack of opportunity for reply. E.g., Convalescent Hosp. Management
cal to the validation decision. 76
The standard enunciated in Hollywood Ceramics also consid-
ered the knowledge possessed by the speaker of the misstate-
ment. If the source was one which caused employees to
reasonably "attach added significance to [the] assertion," the
election may be voided.7 7 The Board weighed whether the em-
ployees believed the speaker had intimate knowledge, not
whether the speaker actually possessed the special knowledge. 78
The intent of the Board was to establish the factors articulated
in Hollywood Ceramics as a clear-cut standard in evaluating mis-
representation issues. However, application of those factors has
frequently caused disagreement among individual Board mem-
bers and courts of appeal.
C. Board Application and Court Disaffection
The standard developed in Hollywood Ceramics was both
"vague and flexible. ' 79 Its application, therefore, required a pro-
gression of subjective interpretations according to the facts of
each election proceeding brought before the Board. For example,
the Board was called upon to determine whether a misrepresen-
tation involved a material issue which departed substantially
from the truth and, if so, whether the resultant impact signifi-
cantly interfered with the election. The consequences of this in-
herent subjectivity have been inconsistent applications and
unpredictable results as different Board members analyzed simi-
lar facts. 80
Corp., 173 N.L.R.B. 38 (1968). But cf United States Gypsum Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 901
(1961) (telegrams containing misrepresentations distributed to employees' super-
visors and posted on bulletin boards by employer two days prior to election held
to be cause to set aside election because union had insufficient time to discover
and correct the misstatements).
76. E.g., NLRB v. Cactus Drilling Corp., 455 F.2d 871, 876 (5th Cir. 1972). See
also WILuAMs, supra note 2, at 40 (whereby parties would be encouraged to cor-
rect misstatements, thus eliminating the tactical advantage that one party may
gain by allowing a misrepresentation to go unanswered and then using the misrep-
resentations as a basis for overturning unsatisfactory election).
77. Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 223-24 & n.10 (1962). See also
NLRB v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 300 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1962); Cumber-
land Wood & Chair Corp., 211 N.L.R.B. 312 n.1 (1974).
78. See MoRRIs, supra note 15, at 93 (citing NLRB v. A.G. Pollard Co., 393 F.2d
239 (Ist Cir. 1968); Cranbar Corp., 173 N.L.R.B. 200 (1968)). See also Bailey Meter
Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 1227 (1972); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 194 N.L.R.B. 1014 (1972); The
Trane Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1506 (1962) (later decisions which considered the "special
knowledge" evaluation as part of materiality determination).
79. Penello, Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc.: The Cure for the Hollywood Ce-
ramics Malaise, 46 U. Cm. L. REV. 464, 465-66 (1977). Penello is a former member
of the NLRB and the leading proponent of overruling Hollywood Ceramics.
80. See WiLiAMs, supra note 2, at 28-61; Bok, supra note 12, at 82-90; Note, La-
bor Law-Shopping Kart: The Need for a Broader Approach to the Problems of
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The uncertainty caused by subjective evaluation was further
exacerbated by Board/court disagreement over application of the
standard. The perceived tendency of the Board to interpret em-
ployer misrepresentations as substantial while finding union mis-
representations to be inconsequential 8 l led the courts to
independently examine the facts of many cases. 82 The majority of
cases before the courts concerned the Board's overruling of em-
ployer claims of union misrepresentation.8 3 As alleged by Mem-
ber Penello, "the judiciary could correct this suspected bias only
by imposing a more rigorous standard in regard to alleged union
abuses, rather than ordering a more lenient standard in regard to
alleged employer abuses." 84 This concern was echoed by the
Campaign Regulation, 56 N.C.L. REV. 389, 394-96 (1978). Compare Gooch Packing
Co., Inc., 200 N.L.R.B. 1096 (1972) (overstatement of wage rates by nine cents was
"puffing") with Follet Corp., 160 N.L.R.B. 506 (1966) (overstatement by seven cents
was substantial deviation from truth). See also NLRB v. A.G. Pollard Co., 393 F.2d
239 (1st Cir. 1968); Ereno Lewis, 217 N.L.R.B. 239 (1975); Medical Ancillary Servs.,
Inc., 212 N.L.R.B. 582 (1974); Cumberland Wood & Chair Corp., 211 N.L.R.B. 312
(1974).
81. See Smither, Does the Goalpost Move When Employers Kick About Union
Misconduct During Elections', 25 LAB. L.J. 578, 578 (1974): "[U]nions ... file ob-
jections almost twice as frequently as employers, but their success rate since 1969
has been approximately three times that of employers, and in 1970 the probability
that the Board would sustain objections filed by a union was four times greater
than in the case of employer objections."; Raskin, supra note 23, at 1175-76. Com-
pare Cross Baking Co. v, NIB, 453 F.2d 1346 (1st Cir. 1971) (Board considered a
15 cents an hour wage misrepresentation by union as inconsequential) with The
Trane Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1506 (1962) (Board considered a one dollar misrepresenta-
tion by employer of union dues as substantial). See also Penello, supra note 79, at
465.
82. See WiLLiAms, supra note 2, at 28-61; Bok, supra note 12, at 82-90. See also
Henderson Trumbull Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 1224 (2d Cir. 1974); Lumi-
nator Div. of Gulton Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 469 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1972) (reversing
Board's evaluation of wage mrisrepresentation); NLRB v. G.K. Turner Assocs., 457
F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1972); Cross Baking Co. v. NLRB, 453 F.2d 1346 (1st Cir. 1971);
NLRB v. Maine Sugar Indus., Inc., 425 F.2d 942 (1st Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Smith In-
dus., Inc., 403 F.2d 889 (5th Cir. 1968); Gallenkamp Stores Co. v. NLRB, 402 F.2d 525
(9th Cir. 1968) (reversing Board's evaluation of wage misrepresentations); Graphic
Arts Finishing Co. v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 893 (4th Cir. 1967) (reversing Board's evalua-
tion of wage representations); NLRB v. Bata Shoe Co., 377 F.2d 821 (4th Cir. 1967);
NLRB v. Bonnie Enters., Inc., 341 F.2d 712 (4th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Houston Chron-
icle Publishing Co., 300 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1962) (reversing Board's evaluation of
whether statements were misrepresentations). The Board is an administrative
body. Thus, the courts of appeal are given an opportunity to review the record
when called upon to enforce a Board order to bargain.
83. See Penello, supra note 79, at 465.
84. Id. Cf. NLRB v. Bonnie Enters., Inc., 341 F.2d 712 (4th Cir. 1965) (board
certification of election overruled because of union misrepresentation on election
day and day preceding).
Eighth Circuit which remarked: "It should hardly need saying
that [the Hollywood Ceramics standard] no less applies to mate-
rial misrepresentation by a union than by an employer." 85 Thus, a
number of Board bargaining orders were denied enforcement. 86
The proclivity of the courts to adopt a more stringent applica-
tion of the standard was not the only cause of Board/court disa-
greement. In some instances, the vagueness of the standard
made it difficult to evaluate the factors. For example, in determin-
ing whether there existed an opportunity to rebut the misrepre-
sentation (the "timing" factor), the Board and courts have had
difficulty when examining repeated misrepresentations. As illus-
trated by Aircraft Radio Corp., 87 a misrepresentation was re-
peated frequently, with the final misstatement immediately
preceding the election. The Board concluded the opportunity to
rebut was available to the employer following the initial misrepre-
sentation. Consequently, the employer was ordered to bargain
with the union. The court of appeals, however, denied enforce-
ment of the bargaining order, placing greater emphasis on the ef-
fectiveness of a rebuttal to a misstatement rather than the mere
opportunity to dispel the falsehood.88 Its reasoning may be con-
sidered circuitous. After chiding the Board for placing too much
weight on the timing factor, the court reversed, concluding that
any prior reply by the employer would have been ineffective,
thereby expanding the scope of evaluation for the timing factor.89
As criticism mounted, the Board sought to reevaluate and clar-
ify the standard developed by Hollywood Ceramics. The opportu-
nity to do so arose in 1973.
D. The Board Defends
The facts of Modine Manufacturing Co. 90 were markedly similar
to those of Hollywood Ceramics. The company alleged the union
overstated the wages achieved at unionized plants while grossly
understating those earned at the employer's plant. Furthermore,
85. NLRB v. Lord Baltimore Press, Inc., 370 F.2d 397, 401 (8th Cir. 1966). See
also Wilkinson Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 456 F.2d 298, 304 (8th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Sani-
tary Laundry, Inc., 441 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1971); The Bendix Corp. v. NLRB, 400
F.2d 141, 146 (6th Cir. 1968).
86. Note, supra note 80, at 396 n.47 (indicating that 51.1% of the Board's deci-
sions in misrepresentation cases have been denied enforcement by the courts in
contrast to a 14.7% denial rate for Board decisions in general).
87. 214 N.L.R.B. 358 (1974).
88. Aircraft Radio Corp. v. NLRB, 519 F.2d 590 (3d Cir. 1975). Compare NLRB
v. Cactus Drilling Corp., 455 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1972), with Lipman Motors, Inc. v.
NLRB, 451 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1971). See WiiAMs, supra note 2, at 39-46.
89. 519 F.2d at 593.
90. 203 N.L.R.B. 527 (1973), enforced 500 F.2d 914 (8th Cir. 1974).
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the union allegedly misinformed employees of its own procedures
for a strike vote.91 Applying Hollywood Ceramics, the Board
found that although the union had technically misrepresented
some issues, common sense dictated that the impact on the elec-
tion process was not significant.92
The Board acknowledged the mounting criticism of commenta-
tors as well as dissatisfaction among its own members with the
approach taken by Hollywood Ceramics. 93 It further noted the in-
creases in employee sophistication and improvements in educa-
tional background which might eventually lessen the need for
protection. 94 However, it was not yet willing to abandon the pro-
tections afforded by the standard. To do so would subject em-
ployees to a "barrage of flagrant deceptive misrepresentations. '95
To support continuation of Hollywood Ceramics; the Board
reemphasized the original narrow focus of the standard which did
not require complete accuracy in campaign electioneering. 96
Stressing that a common sense yet experienced approach would
best facilitate application of the standard, the Board asked the
courts to defer to their "administrative expertise" in determining
whether campaign propaganda exhibited a "tendency materially
to mislead" employees, thereby impairing freedom of choice.9 7
The hope of a greater court deference to the Board's expertise
was dashed by the merry-go-round experience illustrated in Medi-
cal Ancillary Services, Inc.98 First heard in 1972, the company
charged the union with misrepresenting the employer's position
by reporting that it had denied disability insurance and failed to
pay for overtime. The Board, applying Hollywood Ceramics, over-
91. 203 N.L.R.B. at 530-31. Although a two-thirds vote is required for a strike,
there were numerous exceptions which the union failed to mention.
92. Id. at 531.
93. Id. at 529-30.
94. Id. at 530.
95. Id.
96. Id. Pursuant to Hollywood Ceramics, the parties have a right to a "free
and vigorous campaign" and thus "exaggeration, inaccuracies, half-truths, and
name-calling" would not invalidate an election. 140 N.L.R.B. at 224 & n.6. See also
Truesdale, From General Shoe to General Knit: A Return to Hollywood Ceramics,
30 LAB. L.J. 67, 69 (1979). Truesdale is a former member of the NLRB and a lead-
ing proponent of Hollywood Ceramics.
97. 203 N.L.R.B. at 531.
98. 212 N.L.R.B. 582, supplementing, 195'N.L.R.B. 290, rev'd and remanded, 478
F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1973). See also NLRB v. Snokist Growers, Inc., 532 F.2d 1239 (9th
Cir. 1976); LaCrescent Constant Care Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 510 F.2d 1319 (8th Cir.
1975); Henderson Trumbull Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 1224 (2d Cir. 1974).
ruled the employer's objections and issued a bargaining order.99
The court of appeals disagreed and remanded the case to the
Board for a hearing. 0 0 Without comment, the Board reversed its
initial finding by adopting the ruling of the Hearing Officer and or-
dered a new election.01
The decision provoked the first of two vigorous dissents by
Member Penello who exhorted the Board to overturn Hollywood
Ceramics. He argued that the application of the standard had
caused "extensive analysis of campaign propaganda, restriction of
free speech, increasing litigation, and unwarranted delays in the
finality of election results."' 0 2 The theme of the dissent centered
on the majority's treatment of employees as "retarded children"
when in fact the Board had no duty "to protect voters from their
own gullibility."I03 Penello believed that Board intervention
should be limited to instances involving "intentional trickery," for
in those cases employees "could have no reason to suspect and no
reason to check for authenticity."'o4
Despite the dissents and continued criticism by commentators,
the court continued to demand stringent application of the stan-
dard.105 However, when Chairwoman Murphy and Member
Walther indicated they would adopt the approach advocated by
Member Penello for future cases, 0 6 the burial of Hollywood Ce-
ramics was inevitable.
IV. THE REVOLVING DOOR
In 1977, 1978 and 1982, the Board embarked on an odyssey to
formulate the definitive statement of its policy towards misrepre-
sentation issues. However, the policy which prevailed at any
99. Medical Ancillary Servs., Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 290 (1972).
100. NLRB v. Medical Ancillary Servs., Inc., 478 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1973).
101. Medical Ancillary Servs., Inc., 212 N.L.R.B. 582 (1974).
102. Id. at 584. Member Penello stated the "case illustrates graphically the re-
strictive interpretation that has been put on Hollywood Ceramics and its progeni-
tor, The Gummed Products Company, 112 N.L.R.B. 1091 (1955), and the need for a
complete reevaluation of the Board's approach to misleading campaign propa-
ganda." 212 N.L.R.B. at 584.
103. 212 N.L.R.B. at 585-86. In Ereno Lewis, 217 N.L.R.B. 239, 242-43 (1975),
Member Penello again decried the "misguided paternalism" of the majority in
finding an employer's statement, which inaccurately portrayed by $3.00 union dues
and fees, as a substantial departure from the truth. Asserting that continued ad-
herence to the standard could be based only on a misguided belief of employee
naivete, he urged the Board to provide Hollywood Ceramics with a "decent bur-
ial." 217 N.L.R.B. at 240.
104. Medical Ancillary Servs., Inc., 212 N.L.R.B. at 586.
105. See Phalen, supra note 9, at 456. See also NLRB v. Snokist Growers, Inc.,
532 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1976); LaCrescent Constant Care Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 510
F.2d 1319 (8th Cir. 1975).
106. See Phalen, supra note 69, at 456.
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point in time reflected the views of the most recent appointees to
the Board. The lack of Board resolution in this area has caused
an era of uncertainty. As each new appointee walked through the
door, the definitive statement was reevaluated and, as though a
part of a revolving door, the policy came and went as did the ap-
pointees. During these years, on divided Board votes of three to
two, it either overruled or returned to the Hollywood Ceramics
standard.
A. 1977-Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc.
In April of 1977, Hollywood Ceramics was overruled by Shop-
ping Kart Food Market, Inc. 107 The evening before the election, a
union vice-president inaccurately portrayed company profits at
$500,000, ten times their actual level. Without apprising the par-
ties of an intention to reconsider its policy, the Board agreed to
uphold the election by overruling Hollywood Ceramics. 10 8 Absent
deceptive tactics such as misrepresenting Board involvement or
employing forged documents, the Board announced it would no
longer probe into the truth or falsity of campaign statements.109
Reflecting its earlier decision of United Aircraft Corp. 110 the man-
ner of campaign propaganda, not its substance, would be the de-
terminative factor.''
107. 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977).
108. Id. See also Note, Labor Law-Shopping Kart: The Need for a Broader
Approach to the Problems of Campaign Regulation, 56 N.C.L. REV. 389, 390 n.8
(1978). Before advancing arguments in support of Shopping Kart, the Board as-
siduously described its authority to change major policy. Citing NLRB v. A.J.
Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 330 (1946), the Board noted the Supreme Court's acknowl-
edgment of the "wide degree of discretion" possessed by the Board in formulating
policy. Accord NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 767 (1969). Further reli-
ance was placed on a more recent opinion by the Supreme Court where it was
held the exercise of administrative discretion, by necessity, included authority to
revise or modify principles previously adopted. N.L.R.B. v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420
U.S. 251, 265-66 (1975). Specifically, the Court stated: 'To hold that the Board's
earlier decisions froze the development of this important aspect of the national la-
bor law would misconceive the nature of administrative decisionmaking. 'Cumula-
tive experience begets understanding and insight by which judgments . . . are
validated or qualified or invalidated.'" Id. Accord Home Town Foods, Inc. v.
NLRB, 416 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. .969).
109. 228 N.L.R.B. at 1313.
110. 103 N.L.R.B. 102 (1953). See supra note 46.
111. Shopping Kart Food Mkts., Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. at 1314. The Board justified a
deceptive tactics exception on the basis that "while employees are able to evalu-
ate mere propaganda claims, there is simply no way any person could recognize a
forged document for what it is from its face since, by definition, it has been altered
to appear to be that which it is not." Id. Member Murphy concurred, while adding
Foremost among the different reasons advanced for the policy
change was the majority's desire to effectuate employee choice,
promptly."l 2 Protracted litigation, caused by subjective evalua-
tion and Board/court conflict had impeded the attainment of this
goal under Hollywood Ceramics. 113 Therefore, by no longer scru-
tinizing campaign propaganda, litigation would decrease thereby
permitting employee choice to be implemented expeditiously.
Notwithstanding antipathy with protracted litigation, the basis
of the decision was the majority's fundamental disagreement with
the underlying premise of Hollywood Ceramics-the need to pro-
tect employees from campaign misrepresentation.114 Emphasizing
it would not accept "the completely unverified assumption" that
campaign propaganda impeded employee choice, the majority
viewed employees not as "naive and unworldly," but as suffi-
ciently mature to recognize "campaign propaganda for what it
[was] and discount[] it."115 Improvements in education and fa-
miliarity with Board-conducted elections were cited as justifica-
tions for this belief.116
To further support its contention that employees do not need
protection from misleading statements, the majority relied exten-
sively on an empirical study which demonstrated employee
choice was rarely affected by campaign propaganda." 7 The study
an exception. She would also invalidate an election when one party has made an
"egregious mistake of fact." Id. No criteria were proposed to evaluate egregious
mistakes of fact. Rather, she cited two former cases in which she would not have
found egregious mistakes of fact. One case involved a union misstatement of em-
ployer profits-stated: $1 million; actual: $260,376. Henderson Trumbull Supply
Corp., 220 N.L.R.B. 210 (1975). The other case involved a union misstatement of
employee earnings at other plants. The Contract Knitter, Inc., 220 N.L.R.B. 579
(1975).
112. 228 N.L.R.B. at 1313.
113. Id. at 1312-13. See Bok, supra note 12, at 92 (Bok contends that a policy
which restricts campaign statements "resist[s] every effort at clear formulation
and tend[s] inexorably to give rise to vague and inconsistent rulings which baffle
the parties and provoke litigation").
114. See supra notes 64-78 and accompanying text.
115. 228 N.L.R.B. at 1313.
116. Id.
117. J. GETMAN, S. FOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS:
LAw AND REALITY (1976) [hereinafter cited as GETMAN]. The basis of the book is a
two-part empirical study: Getman & Goldberg, The Behavioral Assumptions Un-
derlying NLRB Regulation of Campaign Misrepresentations: An Empirical Evalu-
ation, 28 STAN. L. REV. 263 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Behavioral AssumptionsI
and Getman, Goldberg & Herman, NLRB Regulation of Campaign Tactics: The Be-
havioral Assumptions on Which the Board Regulates, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (1975).
See also Brotslaw, Attitude of Retail Workers Toward Union Organization, 18 LAB.
L.J. 149 (1967), discussing the general inattentiveness of employees to campaign
electioneering. For critiques of the study see King, Preelection Conduct: Ex-
panding Employer Rights and Some New and Renewed Perspectives, DEVELOPING
LABOR LAw 41, 60-66 (F. Penn & L. Black ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as King];
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examined thirty-one election campaigns in five states, finding that
eighty-one percent of employee votes could accurately be pre-
dicted from their precampaign predilections.1 8 Furthermore, on-
ly five percent of the total sample of voters either switched their
vote because of or decided to vote on the basis of campaign
propaganda.19
In a sharply-worded dissent, Members Fanning and Jenkins
took issue with the majority's almost exclusive reliance on an em-
pirical study to overturn a major policy decision.120 The dissent
challenged the methodology employed (post-election polling), the
statistical significance of the sample studied (thirty-one elections)
and both the logic of and conclusion reached by the authors. 121
Assuming, arguendo, the technique and sample were sound, the
dissent claimed the validity of the study would "surely [be] lim-
ited to campaigns conducted in accordance with Hollywood Ce-
ramics standards." 22 In other words, voters in those elections
were most likely not subjected to the barrage of irresponsible and
false campaign propaganda that would exist if the standards were
relaxed. In addressing the balance of the majority's justifications
for overruling Hollywood Ceramics, the dissent viewed the al-
leged administrative burden as minimal when compared to the
"investment in maintaining . . . election standards."'123 Further,
Board/court conflict in applying Hollywood Ceramics, albeit un-
fortunate, was not caused by the nature of the standard. Rather,
it stemmed from those judgmental differences which characteris-
tically emerge when facts are analyzed by different people. 24 Ac-
cording to the dissent, abandoning the regulation of preelection
propaganda could lead only to an escalation of campaign charges
Flanagan, The Behavioral Foundations of Union Election Regulation, 28 STAN. L.
REV. 1195 (1976).
118. GETMAN, supra note 117, at 73. The five states included in the study were
located in the midwest and upper south. Id. at xvi.
119. Behavioral Assumptions, supra note 117, at 282.
120. 228 N.L.R.B. at 1315.
121. Id. at 1311, 1315-16 & 1318.
122. Id. at 1316 & n.34 (dissent claims "[tlhe 2 of 31 cases in which precampaign
intent cannot serve as a 'predicator' of result is almost 7 percent of the total, about
the same percentage as the percentage of 'rerun' elections under Hollywood
Ceramics.")
123. Id. at 1316. The dissent noted that in the past six years, misrepresentation
issues were raised in only three to four and one-half percent of all the cases heard.
Furthermore, new elections were ordered in only seven percent of those cases (25
to 27 second elections per year).
124. Id.
and counter-charges. 25 Thus, "[ais 'bad money drives out good,'
so misrepresentation, if allowed to take the field unchallengeable
as to its impact, will tend to drive out the responsible
statement."126
Whether the portent of the dissent would have occurred is diffi-
cult to determine since there were few post-Shopping Kart deci-
sions. In examining a subsequent charge of employer
misrepresentation, the Board held an understatement of $1.90 of
wages and fringe benefits which employees could expect to re-
ceive from the union amounted to no more than a misleading
campaign statement and, therefore, did not warrant a new elec-
tion.127 In evaluating charges of union misrepresentation, the
Board found an accusation that employer machinations prevented
employee profit-sharing did not interfere with the election pro-
cess. 128 However, in Formco, Inc. v. United Automobile Work-
ers, 129 a union's false assertion that the employer had been found
guilty by the Board of committing unfair labor practices was held
to be a "substantial mischaracterization or misuse of a Board doc-
ument," thereby necessitating a new election.130
With the appointment of Member Truesdale by President
Carter, the Board again reconsidered its policy on misrepresenta-
tion issues. Thus, in December of 1978, less than two years follow-
ing Shopping Kart, the Board reinstated the standard of
Hollywood Ceramics.
B. 1978-General Knit of California, Inc.
Immediately preceding the election, the union in General Knit
of California'3' distributed circulars attesting to the profitability
of the company. The circular referred to the sales of General Knit
before examining the net worth of ITOH, the parent company.
The questionable sentence stated, in part, "[t]his company had a
profit of $19.3 million." The issue concerned the likelihood of con-
fusion among employees as they tried to determine which com-
pany was profitable-General Knit or ITOH. While ITOH
commanded $19.3 million in profits, General Knit sustained a $5
125. Id. at 1316-17.
126. Id. at 1316.
127. Thomas E. Gates & Sons, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 705 (1977).
128. Cormier Hosiery Mills, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1977). See also National
Council of Young Israel, 230 N.L.R.B. 980 (1977).
129. 233 N.L.R.B. 61 (1977).
130. Id. The employer had in fact signed a settlement agreement containing a
non-admissions clause. See also Blackman-Uhler Chemical Div., Synalloy Corp. v.
NLRB, 561 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1977).
131. 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978).
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million loss. 132
The Board proclaimed the principles espoused by Shopping
Kart were inconsistent with its responsibility to insure employee
free choice. 133 Despite the dissent's contention that Hollywood
Ceramics did not recognize employee maturity, the majority
maintained that:
no matter what the ultimate sophistication of a particular electorate, there
are certain circumstances where a particular misrepresentation ... may
materially affect an election. [Such an] election should be set aside in or-
der to maintain the integrity of Board elections and thereby protect em-
ployee free choice.1 3
4
The Board provided detailed reasons to support its reinstat-
ment of Hollywood Ceramics. First, of approximately 9,000 Board-
conducted elections held in 1976, nearly 90 percent went unchal-
lenged.135 Thus, by threatening serious consequences for cam-
paign trickery, the standard of Hollywood Ceramics served as a
deterrent to conduct which interfered with employee choice. 136
Second, Hollywood Ceramics provided a means of redress to
those aggrieved by prejudicial campaign tactics. This accessibil-
ity to the Board "further legitimize[ d] the integrity of the electo-
ral process.' 37 Third, since only 307 of 13,184 representation
election cases in 1976 involved allegations of misrepresentation,
the standard was not administratively burdensome. 3 8 Fourth,
the empirical study, so heavily relied upon by the Shopping Kart
majority, demonstrated that those voters influenced by campaign
propaganda had affected the outcome of twenty-nine percent of
the elections studied.139
In response to its critics, the majority reiterated that the alleged
lack of predictability resulting from the application of Hollywood
Ceramics was not caused by an inherent failure of the standard
but rather by a result of "judgmental differences as to the reason-
able effect of a misrepresentation.' 140 Furthermore, since only
132. Id. at 619-20.
133. Id. at 620.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 621 (citing 41. NLRB Ann. Rep. 231 (1976)).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. The majority noted that the 13,184 representation cases were in con-
trast to 32,406 unfair labor practice cases.
139. Id. at 622 (undecided voters and voters who switched sides were determi-
native factors in 9 of 31 elections).
140. Id.
nine cases in 1976 were appealed to the courts, the allegation that
Hollywood Ceramics was employed by the parties as a delaying
tactic was "greatly exaggerated."141 Regardless of any dilatory ef-
fect, the majority would not pursue election expediency at the ex-
pense of maintaining election standards. 42 To blunt future
criticism, the majority promised to "adhere strictly" to the origi-
nal intent of Hollywood Ceramics, a rule which, in their opinion,
enhanced employee choice and ensured fairness in the election
process.143
In a lengthy dissent, Member Penello restated his views' 44 as
described in the majority opinion of Shopping Kart. 145 Particular
emphasis was placed on the inconsistency in application of the
standard and the dilatory consequences of such Board/court con-
flict. 146 To illustrate the magnitude of the problem, the dissent
noted that the average time between filing a charge of misrepre-
sentation to its resolution by the Board was over fourteen
months. 147 This delay was further exacerbated by the failure of
the courts of appeal to enforce Board-ordered bargaining in forty-
seven cases during the years from 1966 'to 1978.148 These two ex-
amples served to demonstrate the dissent's belief that Hollywood
Ceramics tended only to frustrate collective bargaining and de-
feat the desires of employees. Since the standard established by
Shopping Kart would only consider the form of the alleged mis-
representation, not its substance, the evaluative inconsistency
and dilatory effect would be reduced. 49
An opportunity to further proclaim the qualities of Shopping
Kart arose in August of 1982. With the appointment of three Rea-
gan members to the Board, a new majority was formed which
beat a quick retreat from the standard articulated under
Hollywood Ceramics and General Knit.
C. 1982-Midland National Life Insurance Company
In Midland National Life Insurance Co., the Board resurrected
141. Id. at 623. Further, since 1947, the highest number of cases appealed in
any one year was eleven.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 624. Member Murphy also ified a dissent. Id. at 632.
145. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
146. General Knit of California, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 619, 626 (1978).
147. Id. at 627.
148. Id. at 626. It takes an average of seven and one-half months between issu-
ance of the Board's bargaining order and a decision by a court of appeals. Thus,
the entire process takes approximately twenty-two months. Id. at 627.
149. Id. at 629.
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the noninterventionist approach espoused by Shopping Kart.15 0
The dispute between Midland and the Union, Local 304A, began in
1978 when the union challenged the results of a Board-conducted
election. The Board and court of appeals sustained the charge,
finding the employer had engaged in objectionable conduct which
undermined the election process. A second election was held in
October of 1980, resulting in the defeat of the union by a vote of
107 in favor of representation and 107 against representation. Al-
leging employer campaign propaganda, the union filed objections
to those election results. 5 1
The day before the election, the employer distributed campaign
literature which contained information describing the allegedly
unfortunate impact of Local 304A on three area employers and
displaying a portion of the union's 1979 Labor-Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act [LMRDA] Report.'5 2Photographs and
accompanying text depicted one of the companies as a deserted
facility, implying that a violent strike had caused closure of the
plant. 53 Text describing the union's activities at the other two
companies indicated that employees at one did not yet have a
contract, despite a year of negotiation, and those of the other, who
were still employed following the election, would not receive any
wage increase for another year. 54 Regarding the portion of the
union's 1979 LMRDA Financial Report, the employer's accompa-
nying text stated, "NOTHING-according to the report they filed
with the U.S. Government was spent 'on behalf of the individual
members.' [ sic] ."155
150. 263 N.L.R.B. No. 24 (August 1982).
151. Id. at 3.
152. The LMRDA Financial Report is a financial statement submitted to the De-
partment of Labor pursuant to the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
153. 263 N.L.R.B. No. 24, at 5. The text stated: "They too employed between 200
and 300 employees. This Local 304A struck this plant-violence ensued. Now all
of the workers are gone! What did the Local 304A do for them? Where is the 304A
union job security?" (emphasis in original).
154. Id. at 6. The text for one company stated, in part: "Almost a year ago this
same union ... told the employees of LUTHER MANOR ... [it] would get them
a contract with job security and more money. Unfortunately, Local 304A did not
[say in] . .. what year or century .... Today the employees have no contract."
Id. The text for the other company stated, in part: "Since the election a good per-
centage of its former employees are no longer working there. Ask them! The em-
ployees have been offered a wage increase-next year of 5% .... Id. (emphasis
in original).
155. Id. at 7.
The union maintained there was no strike activity at the time
the first company was closed. Further, they were not involved ini-
tially in the negotiations at the remaining two :facilities, having
subsequently merged with another union which had conducted
those negotiations. As to the financial report, the employer over-
stated by $25,000 the amount disbursed by the union to its officers
and employees, thereby attributing nineteen percent more in in-
come to those individuals. While the report did not indicate any
money had been spent on behalf of individual members, the
union contended the instructions for completion of the report re-
quired that these disbursements be reflected in another
section.156
The new Board majority decided to return to the "sound rule"
articulated in Shopping Kart. 157 By overruling General Knit and
Hollywood Ceramics, the majority contended that election results
would become final by minimizing dilatory objections to those re-
suits.158 These objectives were deemed consistent with the
Board's proper role of assuring "fair and free choice" in selecting
bargaining representatives.159
In support of those contentions, the Board reasserted argu-
ments raised in the majority opinion of Shopping Kart and the
dissent in General Knit. 160 Assailing the inherent subjectivity of
the Hollywood Ceramics standard, the Board challenged those
who disagreed to define "substantial departure," "effective reply,"
"reasonably be expected," and "significant impact."161 Finding
the standard incapable of clear formulation, the majority con-
cluded that continued adherence would result only in discrepant
rulings, thereby provoking protracted litigation.162 In contrast, the
majority found that the principles announced in Shopping Kart
assured objectivity since only the deceptive manner of the alleged
misrepresentation, not its substance, was examined. Thus, Board
intervention was warranted only in those instances, such as the
156. Id. at 8.
157. Id. at 9. Thus the Board rejected the recommendation of the Hearing Of-
ficer. The Hearing Officer had concluded the employer falsely portrayed the union
as an ineffectual, inefficient, violence-prone organization, staffed by highly-paid of-
ficials who would cause employees to suffer both in job security and compensa-
tion. Since the union was not aware of the misrepresentations until three and
one-half hours before the polls were to open, the Hearing Officer, applying the
standard of Hollywood Ceramics and General Knit, directed a third election be
held. Id. at 8.
158. Id. at 15.
159. Id. at 14.
160. See supra notes 112 and 146 and accompanying text.
161. Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. No. 24, at :16 (1982) (emphasis
added).
162. Id. (citing Bok, supra note 12, at 88).
[Vol. 11: 85, 1983] N.L.R.B. Campaign Propaganda
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
use of forged documents, where misrepresentations could not be
recognized as propaganda. 63
As to employee abilities to evaluate the substance of misrepre-
sentations, the majority refused to adopt the paternalistic attitude
advocated by Hollywood Ceramics. Rather, employees were
found to be knowledgeable of the self-serving interests of parties
to an election. 6 4 Since campaign propaganda tended to favor the
interest of the speaker, the Board believed employees would eval-
uate those remarks with "natural skepticism."165 Noting that
under Hollywood Ceramics, elections were not set aside if there
were opportunities for rebuttal, the majority found its dissenters
shared, to a degree, their observation of employee abilities.166
In a ringing dissent, 'Members Fanning and Jenkins postulated
that by returning to Shopping Kart, the majority adopted an "ul-
tra-permissive standard" which invited "the well-timed use of de-
ception, trickery, and fraud."167 Claiming the majority had opted
for administrative expediency at the expense of fair and free elec-
tions, the dissent doubted whether such speedy results would be
achieved under Shopping Kart. 168 To support their suspicion, the
dissent cited an audit which demonstrated a decrease in the total
number of elections conducted in 1978 (the first full year following
Shopping Kart), from those conducted in 1976 (the year before
Shopping Kart), while Board decisions concerning allegations of
misrepresentation increased.169 Furthermore, despite improved
employee education, the dissent saw no need to "abandon them
utterly to the mercies of unscrupulous campaigners."1 70 With the
reestablishment of Shopping Kart, employers and unions would
have "little incentive to refrain from any last-minute decep-
tions."'171 Such last-minute deception was illustrated in Midland
National where employer misrepresentations were not only sub-
stantial but evidenced an "elaborately conceived fraud" by its
163. Id. at 17.
164. Id. at 18.
165. Id. at 18.
166. Id. at 19 & n.21.
167. Id. at 24.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 26. In 1976, 8,899 elections were conducted with rulings on misrepre-
sentation charges in 327 cases. In 1978, 8,464 elections were conducted with rulings
on misrepresentation charges in 357 cases.
170. Id. at 28.
171. Id. at 28-29.
description of the union's financial report. 7 2 According to the dis-
sent, such material misrepresentations affected the election, par-
ticularly in view of the 107 to 107 tally.173
V. THE PROBLEM
Over the past twenty years, the Board's policy towards propa-
ganda has reflected two extreme positions on how best to ensure
employee free choice during the election process. The ap-
proaches propounded by Hollywood Ceramics/General Knit and
Shopping Kart/Midland National emanate from a fundamental
disagreement concerning the level of protection to be afforded
employees who may ultimately become pawns of competing inter-
ests in an emotionally charged election contest. This fundamen-
tal disagreement has evolved into either an attack on or a defense
of the standard developed in Hollywood Ceramics. Three issues
have been the focus of debate: one, the subjectivity of evaluation
causing inconsistent applications and unpredictable results; two,
the delay in reaching final determination of employee choice; and,
three, the degree to which campaign propaganda influences em-
ployees. Uncertainty as to which policy will be adopted by an in-
coming Board requires the development of an approach which
will provide stability to the election process.
A. The Subjectivity
Charges of subjectivity and vagueness, leading to unpredictable
results, have plagued the standard of Hollywood Ceramics since
its inception. 7 4 Interpretation of each factor-substantiality, ma-
teriality, significant impact, timing and source-is not supported
by clearly formulated and objective criteria. 175 Rather, interpreta-
tion is dependent upon the judgmental assessments of individual
Board members as they analyze a myriad of incidents involving
allegations of misrepresentation. 7 6 Thus, the nature of the stan-
dard is incapable of precise definition, leading to incongruous ap-
plications and discrepant results as interpretations are made by
different individuals. Two decisions illustrate the difficulty in
weighing the factors. In one instance, the Board found that the
overstatement of competitive wage rates by nine cents was not a
substantial departure from the truth. 7 7 This determination was
172. Id. at 29.
173. Id. at 31.
174. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
175. See Bok, supra note 12, at 92.
176. See WmLiMAs, supra note 2, at 57.
177. Gooch Packing Co., 200 N.L.R.B. 1096 (1972).
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in contrast to an earlier decision which held an overstatement by
seven cents substantially departed from the truth.178 Although
some proponents of Hollywood Ceramics have submitted that the
nature of the standard is not the cause of disparate results,179
Truesdale, a pro-Hollywood Ceramics Board member, admitted it
compels the Board "to draw lines more nice than obvious."180
In contrast, advocates of Shopping Kart promise that its stan-
dard of limiting examination of misrepresentation to those in-
stances involving a deception "can be clearly formulated and
consistently applied."' 8 ' Whether that prediction will come true
remains to be seen since so few cases have been decided under
Shopping Kart. 182 Arguably, the Board will have to develop crite-
ria to assist in determining the parameters of "deceptive man-
ner." Will it be limited to forged documents so that mere
propaganda, regardless of its egregious character, will not be eval-
uated? Or, will deceptive manner include documents which,
though legitimate on their faces, contain doctoring of key words,
as argued by the dissent in Midland National?183 Member
Penello, the leading proponent of Shopping Kart, acknowledged
he could not predict the limits of campaign trickery, implying that
forged documents may be only one manner of deception requiring
Board analysis.184 Thus, parties could necessitate Board exami-
nation of misrepresentation issues not on the basis of their sub-
stance but rather in challenging the breadth of deceptive manner.
There are other indicia that Board intervention will not be so
limited as entertained by the majority in Shopping Kart and Mid-
land National. Proponents of neutrality in representation elec-
tions, while urging the Board to no longer probe into the truth or
falsity of campaign statements, encourage intervention in those
instances where there is "intentional deception rising to the level
of actual fraud." 8 5 The ability to determine the existence of ac-
tual fraud appears to require a probing into the character of the
178. Follet Corp., 160 N.L.R.B. 506 (1966).
179. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
180. Truesdale, supra note 96, at 71.
181. See Penello, supra note 79, at 466.
182. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
184. Penello, supra note 79, at 467. The majority in Midland Nat'l apparently
did not accept the further limitation of "egregious mistake of fact" as proposed by
Member Murphy in Shopping Kart. 228 N.L.R.B. at 1314.
185. See WnALIs, supra note 2, at 61.
misrepresentation and thus, may necessitate the development of
criteria to evaluate such claims on a case-by-case basis.186 Fur-
ther, Member Penello insists that despite the limitations envi-
sioned by Shopping Kart, the Board will continue to distinguish
between those statements which are merely misleading and those
which are coercive. 187 The ability to draw this distinction, without
examining the content of the alleged statements and thus, intro-
ducing subjective interpretation into the process, is not apparent.
As noted by Thomas Phalen, former attorney for the National La-
bor Relations Board, should standards have to be developed to
evaluate such challenges, the "overruling of Hollywood Ceramics
would be truly more a fantasy than a fact."' 88
The charge of subjectivity has also been leveled against
Hollywood Ceramics as the cause of Board/court conflict. The
absence of objective criteria has enabled the courts to interpret
the standard more rigidly than the Board.189 This restrictive ap-
plication has resulted in the denial of Board-ordered bargaining.
While the denial rate of all Board bargaining orders is approxi-
mately fifteen percent, the set aside rate for those cases involving
misrepresentation issues is approximately fifty-two percent1 90
This discrepancy in enforcement rates is a legitimate complaint
against the subjectivity of the Hollywood Ceramics standard.
Those favoring the Shopping Kart approach maintain that
Board/court conflict would be greatly minimized in the future.19'
Again, few decisions are available to judge the accuracy of that
prediction. 92 However, in a 1977 decision, Blackman-Uhler Chem-
ical Division, Synalloy Corp., 193 the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held en banc that while the bargaining order was not
enforceable under Hollywood Ceramics, the decision may differ
with application of Shopping Kart. The employer charged the
union with materially misrepresenting the company's profits. The
186. See Phalen, supra note 69, at 457.
187. Penello, supra note 79, at 467. Board member Penello made that distinc-
tion in Honeywell, Inc., 225 N.L.R.B. 617 (1976), finding the employer's campaign
statement ("But all of this effort could be wasted if we can't continue to work ef-
fectively as a team. I therefore feel the interference of a labor union would only
hinder our chances of further recovery.") to be coercive and thus in violation of
section 8(a)(1). The dissent considered the statement to be mere propaganda. Id.
at 618.
188. Phalen, supra note 69, at 457.
189. See supra notes 81-89 and accompanying text.
190. General Knit of California, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 619, 626 (1978) (Penello, dis-
senting) (citing 42 NLRB Ann. Rep. 261 (1977)). To further emphasize the set-
aside rate, Member Penello listed forty-seven cases which were denied enforce-
ment between the years 1966 and 1978.
191. Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. at 17.
192. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
193. 561 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1977).
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Board, applying Hollywood Ceramics, rejected the employer's ar-
guments and ordered bargaining. Although the court of appeals
denied enforcement of the bargaining order, the court noted that
Shopping Kart "may well have an impact on the obligation of the
employer to engage in collective bargaining negotiations .. ,"194
Whether Shopping Kart will lead to less Board/court conflict
could well depend on whether the Board determination of "decep-
tive manner" ultimately reaches the courts for their
interpretation.
B. The Delay
The unpredictability of results under Hollywood Ceramics has
also led to charges that application of the standard causes not
only delay in implementing employee choice but also that it is
susceptible to being used as a delaying tactic.195 Those finding
fault with the standard claim that allegations of misrepresenta-
tion have become commonplace. 96 Because one out of every two
employer objections in 1976 was based on misrepresentation,
there is merit to the charge that the objections raised by employ-
ers frequently, or routinely, involve allegations of misrepresenta-
tion.197 Although few of these objections are sustained by the
Board,198 the delay in issuing a bargaining order approaches four-
teen months.199 Member Penello further contended that since
other objections to election results were sustained at a rate of
seventeen percent, the only reason so many frivolous claims were
filed was to delay the certification process. 200 On the other hand,
194. Id. at 1119.
195. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
196. Shopping Kart Food Mkt., Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. at 1312-13.
197. In 1976, there were 467 election objections raised by employers, 223 involv-
ing charges of union misrepresentation. 41 NLRB Ann. Rep. 66, 232 app., table llC
(1976); Shopping Kart Food Mkt., Inc. 228 N.L.R.B. at 1316 (223 figure).
198. See Member Fanning's dissenting opinion in Shopping Kart Food Mkt.,
Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311, 1316 (1977), for percentage of employer objections sustained
between 1971 and 1976 which varied from a high of 10.6% to a low of 1.7%.
199. See General Knit of California, Inc., 239 N.LR.B. at 627. However, the pro-
cess from Board election to circuit court opinion takes approximately twenty-two
months. Id. Under 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1976), a union which loses an election
cannot seek a second election for twelve months. The delay caused by objections
to the election frequently surpass that limitation.
200. General Knit of California, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. at 626, 627 (Penello dissent-
ing). Board member Penello commented that "an employer is guaranteed (ap-
proximately two years] by simply filing a Hollywood Ceramics objection,
regardless of its merits." Id. (emphasis added).
the "routineness" and dilatory effect of such objections can be
tempered by statistics indicating that of the elections conducted,
an average of only three to four and one-half percent resulted in
allegations of misrepresentation. 20 1 Furthermore, despite the
lengthy delays resulting from raising misrepresentation objec-
tions, only nine cases were appealed to the courts in 1976. Thus,
only one-tenth of one percent of the elections were delayed by ap-
plication of the standard.20 2 Whether Hollywood Ceramics has an
overwhelming dilatory effect on employee choice should also be
viewed in light of the fact that ninety percent of the election re-
sults were not challenged by either party,203 arguably supporting
the belief that the standard prevents delays in achieving finality
of the election process.
When the Board refuses to sustain an employer objection to an
election, the union is certified and a bargaining order is issued.
The certification decision is not appealable to the courts. 204 How-
ever, further delay in implementing employee choice occurs when
an employer refuses to bargain with the duly-certified union. By
simply refusing to bargain with the union, the employer is found
guilty of an unfair labor practice. Continued failure to bargain
forces the Board to seek court enforcement of its order. At that
time, not only is the unfair labor practice reviewed by the court
but also the original election determination, including allegations
of misrepresentation during the election process. 205
Although advocates of Shopping Kart maintain that it will not
serve as a similar tool for delay, the avenue of appeal will still be
available to those parties who refuse to comply with an order to
bargain. The determination of whether a deceptive manner was
in fact involved in the election process would then be reviewed,
as the Board and courts seek to establish the scope of the
limitation.
C. The Degree of Influence of Propaganda on Employees
Although the above factors influence Board members, the pri-
mary cause of divergent approaches toward regulation of cam-
paign propaganda is a fundamental disagreement over the degree
to which employees require protection during the election pro-
cess. The levels of protection recommended by Hollywood Ce-
ramics and Shopping Kart are founded on dissimilar
201. 228 N.L.R.B. at 1316.
202. See Truesdale, supra note 96 at 72.
203. Id.
204. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f) (1976). See American Fed'n of Labor v. NLRB, 308
U.S. 401 (1940).
205. 29 U.S.C. § 159(d) (1976).
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assumptions regarding employee behavior, the cornerstone of
which is whether employees are influenced by preelection mis-
representations. Critics of Hollywood Ceramics maintain its pa-
ternalistic approach views employees as unworldly, naive
children who are greatly influenced by campaign propaganda.206
Shopping Kart, however, recognizes their increased levels of ma-
turity and education which moderate the influence of campaign
propaganda, thereby obviating a need for protection. 20 7 Propo-
nents of Hollywood Ceramics counter that increased levels of
education neither neutralize the influence of misrepresentation
nor warrant abandonment of employees to unscrupulous
campaigners. 208
The median educational level of employees has increased over
the past twenty years. In 1962, the year Hollywood Ceramics was
announced, the median years of school completed by blue-collar
workers was 10.4.209 The level increased to 12.2 in 1977, the year of
Shopping Kart.2 10 The proponents of Hollywood Ceramics con-
tend that employees are influenced by election propaganda.2 11
However, there was no empirical study performed to substantiate
their conclusion.212 In fact, whether the increased educational
level affects the influence of campaign propaganda at all is diffi-
cult to discern, since only limited analysis of those behaviorial as-
sumptions has been conducted.2 13 Nevertheless, the continuing
increase in employee educational levels, coupled with their grow-
ing experience with the Board-election process, imply a degree of
sophistication or healthy skepticism beyond that recognized in
Hollywood Ceramics.
Conversely, Shopping Kart relied extensively on an empirical
206. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
209. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, Table 70, p.141-42 (Dec.
1980).
210. Id.
211. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
212. See Getman & Goldberg, The Myth of Labor Board Expertise, 39 U. CHI. L.
REV. 681, 682 (1972).
213. See Bok, supra note 12, at 40, 46-53, 88-90. There have been a few limited
studies on voting behavior. Brotslaw, Attitude of Retail Workers Toward Union Or-
ganization, 18 LAB. L.J. 149 (1967); Fitzgerald & Froelke, An Examination of Two
Aspects of the NLRB Representation Election: Employee Attitudes and Board In-
ferences, 3 AKRON L. REV. 218 (1970).
analysis known as the Getman, Goldberg and Herman Study.214
According to the majority, the study cast doubt on the assumption
that employees were swayed by campaign propaganda. 2 15 The au-
thors of the study interviewed over one thousand employees who
participated in thirty-one elections conducted in five midwestern
states. 2 16 Eighty-one percent of the employees voted in accord-
ance with their predilection towards jobs and unions.2 17 The au-
thors concluded that employee choice is, therefore, not affected
by campaign propaganda.2 18 Furthermore, other supporting data
indicated that employees are generally inattentive during cam-
paigns and, thus, would not be influenced by either employer or
union propaganda.219
Both the study and the Board's reliance thereon generated im-
mediate criticism. 220 The majority appeared to adopt the study's
findings without critical analysis. 22 ' Yet serious questions have
been raised. Despite the conclusion that eighty-one percent of
the employees were not affected by campaign propaganda,
nineteen percent arguably were influenced.222 Data also sug-
gested that, although employees were not familiar with many is-
sues, those issues of importance were recalled.223 However,
evidence demonstrated that those employees who were initially
undecided or who switched their allegiances influenced the out-
214. GETMAN, supra note 117. For an indepth analysis of the study, see Com-
ment, supra note 80, at 399-404.
215. Shopping Kart Food Mkt., Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. at 1313.
216. Behavioral Assumptions, supra note 117, at 265-66.
217. GETMAN, supra note 117 at 53-64, 72-85. Of the 1,200 employees, 43% had
been union members elsewhere and 30% had voted in previous elections. Id. at
66.
218. Id. at 72.
219. Id. at 53-64, 73-85, 140-41. Employees could recall only seven percent of the
union's issues and ten percent of the employer's issues. Id. at 109.
220. See King, supra note 117, at 62-66; Miller, The Getman, Goldberg and Her-
man Questions, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (1976); Phalen, supra note 69, at 457-59;
Truesdale, supra note 96, at 72-74.
221. Shopping Kart Food Mkt., Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. at 1313. The authors of the
study focused on six assumptions upon which they perceived Board decisions
were based. Getman, Goldberg & Herman, supra note 117, at 1472-82. The assump-
tions were: one, that employees are attentive to the campaign; two, that employees
will interpret ambiguous statements by the employers as threats or promises;
three, that employees are unsophisticated about labor relations; and four, that au-
thorization card signing is an indication of employee choice.
222. General Knit of California, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. at 621. Member Penello dis-
agreed, contending only five percent of the voters were influenced by campaign
propaganda. The remaining employees switched their votes for "unknown" rea-
sons. Id. at 628 n.36. However, as noted by Member Truesdale, the authors imply
an employer campaign does have a significant impact. The 31 elections surveyed
were "vigorously contested" by employers. The union won only 35% in contrast to
their nationwide average of 50%. Truesdale, supra note 96, at 73.
223. GETMAN, supra note 117, at 78-83. For example, wage issues were recalled
by 23% to 71% of the employees. Id. at 80-81.
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come of twenty-nine percent of the elections surveyed.224 The pro-
jection of sophisticated employees weighing relevant campaign
issues, as found by Shopping Kart, is somewhat muted by the au-
thors' conclusion that employees are generally inattentive during
the election process. Furthermore, the ability of these sophisti-
cated employees to evaluate the substance of campaign propa-
ganda should enable them to recognize statements which abuse
Board processes or imply a threat to the employee. Perhaps the
most serious indictment of the study is that the elections sur-
veyed were conducted under the protection of Hollywood Ceram-
ics. 225 The propaganda of the parties could have been tempered
so as not to violate the standards which assure elections assimi-
late laboratory conditions.
In summary, neither approach is supported by uncontrovert-
able evidence documenting the degree to which employees are in-
fluenced by preelection propaganda. If the authors' assumption is
accurate, that Board regulation is predicated upon the influence
of propaganda on employee choice, then more indepth behavioral
studies must be conducted.
VI. A CALL FOR CONGRESSIONAL REFORM
The representation election is the primary tool of the Board for
determining employee choice under the NLRA.226 Conceptually,
the election is to produce a winner from among those parties to
the contest. By introducing finality to the campaign, the election
encourages a return to stability in the workplace, one of the enun-
ciated goals of labor policy.227 It is difficult to imagine, however,
stability occurring when parties to the contest, cognizant of the
continuing "flip flop" in Board policy in regulating propaganda,
are not tempted to challenge election results. Rather, this uncer-
tainty in policy or certainty that policy will be changed, may well
foster objections to election results as a matter of course.
No one has suggested that revisions to the Board's policies are
224. Id. at 103. The authors concluded, however, that the Board should not "set
aside election results in many cases in the hope of protecting free choice in a few."
Behavioral Assumptions, supra note 117, at 283.
225. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 5-14 and accompanying text.
227. Samoff, NLRB Elections: Uncertainty and Certainty, 117 U. PA. L REV. 228,
228 (1968).
unwarranted or an abuse of discretion. 228 However, change
should be motivated not only by furtherance of the Act's princi-
ples but by sober inquiry into the issue under consideration. It is
highly questionable that the Board's use of ad hoc adjudication
provides a forum for sober inquiry. Since the policy for regulating
campaign propaganda has been reversed in three of the past five
years, skepticism as to the underlying rationale for initiating
change has emerged. This skepticism becomes more plausible
when the ever-changing response to campaign propaganda can be
traced directly to the political composition of the Board. 229 This
politicizing of Board policy has been recognized in commentaries
and Congressional debate.230 Although "policy-making is poli-
tics,"12 31 recent decisions reflect a built-in polarization and single-
minded obtuseness which "eliminate any hope that discussion
and persuasion with other members [of the Board] will have any
effect. '232 Because regulation of campaign propaganda tends to
be so highly sensitive to political forces and thus subject to
change as each administration takes control, employee interests
may not be served by sincere motivations or sober inquiries.
Consequently, Congressional reform is advocated to establish a
national response towards the regulation of preelection misrepre-
sentation so that those most affected, employees, do not become
political pawns of the Board.
The pivotal issues to be weighed by Congress are the need of
employees to be protected from propaganda versus the restriction
of the participants' speech during an election.233 Since few behav-
ioral studies of the influence of propaganda on the exercise of em-
ployee choice have been conducted, Congress may not have
228. See, e.g., NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975) (holding that
Board possesses administrative discretion in decision-making and, thus, can revise
or modify principles previously adopted). See also Home Town Foods, Inc. v.
NLRB, 416 F.2d 392 (1969).
229. Hollywood Ceramics, 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962) (Kennedy Board); Shopping
Kart Food Mkt., Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977) (Nixon Board); General Knit of Cali-
fornia, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978) (Carter Board); Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263
N.L.R.B. No. 24 (1982) (Reagan Board).
230. See generally Hickey, supra note 56, at 460-63; Wirtz, supra note 42, at 611-
12; WiiAAMs, supra note 2, at 6-13; 120 CONG. REC. 11303 (1974), where Senator
Tower stated "Board doctrine is susceptible to changes in the political climate
and, most particularly, to changes in the Presidency." See also Peck, A Critique of
the National Labor Relations Board's Performance in Policy Formulation: Adjudi-
cation and Rule-Making, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 254, 267, n.87 (1968).
231. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcTION 22 (abr. student ed.
1965).
232. 120 CONG. REC. 11306 (1974).
233. Congress has encouraged honest behavior in some areas: e.g., truth in ad-
vertising, (15 U.S.C. §§ 52-55 (1976)); truth in lending, (15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693 (1976
& Supp. IV 1980)); and financial disclosure in political campaigns (2 U.S.C. §§ 431-
456 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
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sufficient empirical data available to guide their determina-
tions.234 Further, the Board's propensity to formulate its propa-
ganda policies by adjudication rather than formalized rulemaking
has precluded valuable testimony from affected individuals as to
their views of the impact of propaganda on the process. 235 Thus,
Congress must arrive at its own determination, through Congres-
sional hearings and debate, as to the need to shield employees
from propaganda at tlhe expense of regulating honesty in cam-
paign speech.
Prior Congressional regulation of speech during campaigns has
evolved from stringently protecting employees to a gradual recog-
nition of their abilities to interpret campaign rhetoric appropri-
ately. Their initial view was that employees were highly
influenced by employer propaganda. Because of the disparity in
economic power, employer expressions were inherently sugges-
tive of reprisals.23 6 Thus, employers were precluded from com-
ment during organizational campaigns. 237 By 1947, with the
addition of section 8(c), employees were viewed as sufficiently so-
phisticated to permit employers the exercise of their free speech
rights, absent threats of reprisal or promises of benefit.238 When
the Board limited applicability of section 8(c), 239 Congressional
debate reflected growing sentiment that employees were able to
interpret appropriately campaign propaganda during the election
process. In 1954, the first attempt to extend section 8(c) to elec-
tion proceedings failed.240 However, in 1974, discontent with the
234. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
235. The Board is authorized to "make, amend, and rescind ... such rules and
regulations as may be necessary. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1970). Rulemaking proce-
dures permit written arguments to the proposed rule and, at times, oral presenta-
tions by interested parties. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)-(e) (1976 & Supp. V. 1981). See also
Peck, supra note 230.
236. In 1935, Congress rejected an amendment to the Wagner Act which would
have guaranteed employer free speech. Koretz, supra note 29 (citing H.R. Rep.
No. 1371, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1935)). This view was supported by the Board in
1936, which commented: "'The power of an employer over the economic life of an
employee is felt intensely and directly." As a result, "[tihe employee is sensitive
to each subtle expression of hostility upon the part of one whose good will is so
vital to him, whose power is so unlimited, whose action is so beyond appeal."
Wheeling Steel Corp., 1 N.L.R.B. 699, 709 (1936), per curiam, 94 F.2d 1021 (6th Cir.
1938).
237. See supra notes 15.18 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 29..34 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 35.41 and accompanying text.
240. See Koretz, supra :note 29, at 409 (citing Sen. Rep. No. 1211, 83rd Cong., 2d
Sess. (1954)).
continued limitations on speech during the election process
reemerged. The attack was led by Senator John Tower who em-
phasized that the intent of section 8(c) was not limited to unfair
labor practices and, further, that the concept of laboratory condi-
tions as a requisite to election proceedings was unprecedented in
an election process:
That reading of the statute, unsupported as it is by statutory language and
surely in conflict with the spirit of Section 8(c), is itself hardly mandatory.
Needless to say, the concept of "laboratory conditions" for elections has
no counterpart in American political practice. Indeed, the idea that
speech of any kind, much less "protected speech" can invalidate an elec-
tion is unacceptable outside of labor law, and is dubious within it.2 41
Despite Senator Tower's statement, the legislative history con-
cerning the scope of section 8(c) has been characterized as "con-
fusing."242 However, in view of the disposition of Congress at the
time of passing section 8(c), it is unlikely that its coverage was in-
tended to be limited to unfair labor practice cases. 243 To avoid fu-
ture uncertainty in regulating campaign propaganda, Congress
should exercise its preeminent jurisdiction in the field of labor re-
lations and amend section 8(c) 24 to include representation
cases. 245 Thus, section 8(c) would read:
The expressing of any views, argument or opinion, or the dissemination
thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not (i)
constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any provisions
of this Act, or (ii) constitute grounds for, or evidence justifying, setting
aside the results of any election conducted under any of the provisions of
this Act, if such expresssion contains no threat of reprisal or force or
promise of benefit.
241. REPORT OF THE SUBCOMM. ON SEPARATION OF POWERS OF THE SENATE JUDI-
cLARY COMM., 120 CONG. REC. 11304 (1974).
242. Wollett & Rowen, supra note 27, at 384. The provision's author, Senator
Taft, in response to a question concerning section 8(c) replied: "That provision in
effect carries out approximately the present rule laid down by the Supreme Court
of the United States. It freezes that rule into law itself .... " 93 CONG. REc. 3837
(April 23, 1947) (emphasis added). The rule referred to was rendered in N.L.R.B.
v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941), whereby employer speech was
accorded constitutional protection provided it was noncoercive. However, speech,
as a part of a coercive "course of conduct" could be unlawful. Id. at 477. However,
the decision which section 8(c) codified has been judged as containing "considera-
ble ambiguity." Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61
HARV. L. REV. 1, 17 (1948). In essence, section 8(c) approximates an ambiguous
rule.
243. See generally NLRB v. Shirlington Supermarket, Inc., 224 F.2d 649, 658-59 &
n.5 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 914 (1955); H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess., 8, 33 (1947); 93 CONG. REC. 6859-60, A3043 (1947); supra notes 29-30 and ac-
companying text.
244. For current 8(c), see supra text accompanying note 32.
245. Senator Tower proposed legislation to amend section 8(c) in 1977. The bill
was entitled the "Employee Bill of Rights Act." Section 6, "Protection of Free
Speech," would have effectively deregulated campaign speech. S. 1885, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 6 (1977). In July, 1978, the bill was resubmitted to the Committee on
Human Resources, ending any hope of labor reform in the 95th Congress. 124
CONG. REC. S18393-18400 (June 22, 1978).
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Further, Congress should make it quite clear that misrepresenta-
tion of fact and similar statements are considered as views, argu-
ment and opinion.
Failure of Congress to take a stand on the regulation of cam-
paign propaganda will subject the parties to a continuing era of
policy uncertainty. More importantly, however, the stand to be
taken by Congress must recognize the forum being regulated-an
election. A decision to amend section 8(c) as opposed to codify-
ing Shopping Kart or Hollywood Ceramics provides Congress
with some justification to interfere with an election process since
it has indicated previously an intolerance of coercive speech in
the context of labor relations.24 6
Admittedly, any regulation of campaign speech implies that the
audience (employees) is not sufficiently intelligent or sophisti-
cated to recognize the speech as propaganda. Thus, the outcome
of an election will be viewed as a distortion of employee choice
unless the process is purified. However, in political elections, the
general electorate is bombarded with distortions, half-truths and
innuendos concerning competing candidates. That electorate is
viewed, nonetheless, as sufficiently intelligent and sophisticated
to sift through the rhetoric and arrive at a choice of individuals to
serve in positions of responsibility. Senator Tower was correct in
his assertion that the concept of "laboratory conditions for elec-
tions has no counterpart in American political practice." 247 One
can only imagine the chaos which would result "if twenty percent
of the losing candidates challenged the results of their [political]
elections, as do twenty percent of the losers in NLRB elec-
tions." 248 Should an overly-restrictive regulation of campaign
speech be adopted, Congress could be suggesting that it views
employee-voters as "a special kind of electorate" who acquire
greater insight during political elections. 249
This is not to suggest that representation elections and political
elections are identical, although they are functionally analogous.
One distinction involves the accessibility of voters in a political
246. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 240 and accompanying text. There have been laws regulat-
ing political activity. However, they have regulated campaign financing and lobby-
ing, not campaign speech. See, e.g., The Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C.
§§ 431-456 (1976 & Supp. V. 1981); The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 2 U.S.C.
§§ 261-70 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
248. Samoff, supra note 227, at 230.
249. Id. at 234.
election to analyses of campaign statements. These analyses are
provided by a third party, the press. The worker-voter is rarely
afforded press analyses of campaign speech during representation
elections. With the amendment to section 8(c), however, the
worker-voter will be afforded protection against speech which
could be most harmful to an employee's choice, that of coercive
speech. Further, should accessibility by the employee to oppos-
ing views be considered a necessary procedural safeguard, Con-
gress could direct the Board to establish such procedures through
its rulemaking authority.250
Although extending section 8(c) to representation cases will
not address all criticisms of prior Board regulation of campaign
propaganda, it will be a positive first step towards stabilizing the
process. First, it would provide a Congressional standard against
which the Board must measure campaign speech. Decisions with
respect to representation challenges involving speech will be-
come, to a greater extent, de-politicized. Second, it might provide
a more realistic recognition of employee abilities to evaluate cam-
paign speech. These abilities have been recognized by behavioral
studies of employee-voters conducted to date 25 1 and have always
been considered attributable to voters in political elections.
Third, the delays encountered by prior Board consideration of
misrepresentation challenges would be reduced. By adopting a
standard of evaluation which will not be reversed by incoming
Board appointees, the parties might be encouraged not to chal-
lenge election results in hopes of effecting a policy reversal. Fur-
ther, the courts will no longer have to second-guess Board
application of the misrepresentation standards espoused by deci-
sions such as Hollywood Ceramics. Fourth, the subjective evalua-
tion of campaign speech would be reduced to a determination of
coercive versus noncoercive speech. To prevent; future Boards
from ever expanding their definitions of those incidents constitut-
ing coercive speech, Congress should direct the Board to deter-
mine specifically, through its rulemaking authority, the types of
incidents which qualify as coercive behavior. Although some
commentators may argue that Congressional involvement in set-
ting propaganda policy trammels upon the discretionary judg-
ment of the Board, it can be argued that the Board has failed to
demonstrate an ability to establish policy which reflects the inter-
ests of employees as opposed to political philosophies of individ-
ual Board members. Thus, Congressional reform is warranted.
250. For a description of possible procedural safeguards see Comment, supra
note 18, at 779-90.
251. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 11: 85, 19831 N.L.R.B. Campaign Propaganda
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
VII. CONCLUSION
The representation process is fundamental to the exercise of
employee choice in selecting or rejecting a bargaining agent. The
decision reached impacts directly upon an employee's livelihood.
Since it also affects the balance of power between management
and organized labor, participants to the process engage in serious
and occasionally bitter exchanges of ideas during the campaign.
It is therefore imperative that policies governing the process ap-
propriately address employee interests, by providing sufficient
protection for employee decision-making, permitting a free and
robust exchange of ideas which is so natural to American elec-
tions and encouraging finality and stability to the process.
This article has traced attempts by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board to regulate campaign speech during the representa-
tion process. What began as a policy of noninterference evolved
into a competition between two policies, neither of which fully ad-
dressed employee interests. More importantly, the continual
shifting of policies, reflecting the political composition of the
Board, overshadows the ability of either policy to serve employee
interests. Consequently, Congress is urged to enact legislation
establishing a policy governing preelection speech. Further, it is
recommended that the policy to be enacted extend section 8(c) to
representation proceedings, thus limiting board evaluation of
campaign speech to whether it is coercive in nature. Should it be
necessary to afford greater protection to employee decision-mak-
ing, Congress is encouraged to direct the Board to use its
rulemaking authority to develop appropriate procedural
safeguards.

